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Executive Summ ary
While it is widely held that that state and local governments should not pursue 
income redistribution as a budgetary objective, state and local governments do engage 
in budget policies that have an explicit redistributive objective. On the expenditure side, 
responsibilities range from health, welfare and education (each with a redistributive 
component). State and local governments also impose tax laws that involve 
redistribution including progressive income tax rates, food exemptions for the sales tax, 
and property tax circuit breakers. In short, voters do appear willing to support state and 
local government redistribution policies (Martinez-Vazquez, 1981).
Federal government policies may affect the tendency o f state and local governments 
to do redistribution. The level and composition o f federal grants can affect the price o f 
state and local expenditures, federal deductibility o f state and local taxes affects the cost 
o f tax-related redistribution, and through income effects associated with certain types 
o f  grants.
Economists have devoted relatively little attention to explaining why some state and 
local governments choose more progressive fiscal instruments than do others. This paper 
provides an empirical model to identify the determinants o f income redistribution as a 
budgetary choice, and estimates the strength o f these determinants with state and local 
governm ent panel data for a 21-year period. In particular, we study the following 
questions in an empirical framework:
1. What are the characteristics o f states that undertake higher or lower levels o f 
distribution?
2. Are expenditure-side and tax-side distribution policy instruments substitutes or 
complements in state and local government budgets?
3. What can past behavior tell us about how state and local governments will react 
to an increase in their redistribution responsibilities in the future?
There is no unambiguous way to measure the emphasis on distribution in state and 
local government budgets as virtually every government service and every tax has some 
element o f progressivity or regressivity in it. The choice we use in this paper is to index
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the degree o f  distributional emphasis based on budget shares allocated to redistributive 
services and revenue shares raised from progressive taxes. We classify the following 
as redistributive services: health, welfare, and primary and secondary education. On the 
revenue side, the proportion o f  state and local governments’ individual and corporate 
income taxes in total own source revenue is used as the indicator o f the importance o f 
distribution in the state and local government revenue budget. The appropriateness o f 
these variables is tested by comparing these variables to other potential measures o f 
redistribution and we believe that our measures hold up quite well.
We are seeking an explanation o f what makes state and local governments choose 
more or less redistribution, measured as the percent o f total expenditures on health, 
education, and welfare and the percent o f revenues coming from state and local 
individual and corporate income taxes. We believe that this expenditure/revenue 
redistribution decision is made simultaneously and governments either view the 
expenditure side and revenue side redistribution decision as a complementary one or that 
one substitutes for the other. In this context, two other variables are considered as 
endogenous—per capita federal aid for health and welfare and the poverty rate. Federal 
aid for health and welfare programs will have a significant effect on the likelihood of 
choosing redistributive expenditure policy because o f both income and substitution 
effects. The level o f federal health and welfare aid is itself endogenous to this model 
because the total amount received is determined partly by state and local government 
expenditures on those services.
Higher poverty rates are expected to encourage more redistribution through both tax 
and expenditure policies, but the poverty rate is endogenous to the system because more 
redistributive fiscal policies could encourage in-migration o f the poor or out-migration 
o f  the non-poor thereby increasing the poverty rate in a state.
A number o f variables are chosen as exogenous. For each dependent variable 
(revenue share, expenditure share, poverty, and per capita federal aid) we rely on the 
literature and economic theory to determine appropriate variables. We estimate the four 
equation system for the period 1969-1990 for all state and local governments by state. 
The most important o f  the results is the positive and statistically significant coefficient 
for the endogenous revenue and expenditure distribution variables. For the period 
observed, states appear to view revenue- and expenditure-side distribution policies as
v
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complementary and pursue distribution objectives with both. If a state spends 1 percent 
more o f its budget on redistributive services, it would, on average, raise about 0.35 
percentage points more o f its revenues from income taxes. If a state raises 1 percent 
more o f its revenues from income taxes, it spends 0.041 percent more o f its budget on 
social services.
Expected results are also obtained for the other two endogenous variables. A higher 
poverty rate, ceteris paribus, significantly dampens the share o f social service 
expenditures and the share o f  income taxes. Budget choices in favor o f redistribution 
tend to decrease with heavier concentration o f poverty. The endogenous federal aid 
variable (for health and welfare) have a stimulative effect on the redistributive 
expenditure share in the pre-1982 period, and an even stronger effect in the post-1982 
(Reagan) era, when grants were reduced and mandates were strengthened. Many o f  the 
other results are consistent with expectations.
From the regression results, we also find that, at the margin, and taking both direct 
and indirect effects into account, we might expect more emphasis on social services in 
the expenditure budgets o f states that are less urbanized and have lower levels o f 
income. On the revenue side, states with lower levels o f income, less urbanized 
populations, and a smaller concentration o f black and elderly population tend to make 
more use o f income taxes. Prices do seem to matter. Higher federal matching grant 
rates lead to more redistribution, as does a larger percent o f  federal income tax 
itemizers.
What do these results suggest for future policy? We simulated two potential 
changes in government policy to determine the effect on redistributive expenditure and 
revenue shares for state and local governments. We investigated the two following 
policies: the elimination of the federal matching provision in state-local grants (with a 
hold-harmless assumption in terms o f total amount o f grant received) and the 
elimination o f the federal deductibility o f state income taxes.
Interestingly, our model predicts that the shift to block grants does not lead to a de­
emphasis o f fiscal redistribution by state and local governments. The significant relative 
price increase for health and welfare services raises the redistributive expenditure share 
fundamentally because o f the relatively low price elasticity o f demand for social welfare 
services. Thus, states would be buying less services but spending more than before.
vi
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The income effect associated with the shift from matching to block grants assumed in 
the simulation partially offsets the effect o f the change in relative prices by lowering the 
redistributive expenditure share. The net effect is estimated to be 5-percentage-point 
increase in the expenditure share for social services. The model also predicts a 1.76 
percentage-point increase in the income tax share: voters would be willing to accept 
some increase in the income tax share so that their redistribution target would not be met 
entirely on the expenditure side o f the budget.
The elimination o f the federal income tax deduction for state and local taxes 
(holding total income harmless) would reduce the number o f income tax payers who 
itemize deductions, thereby raising the price o f state income taxes and lowering the 
income tax share. Secondly this change would increase the level o f (after tax) personal 
income thereby further reducing the income tax share. The total effect is that the 
redistribution revenue share would fall by about 1.31 percentage points. On the 
expenditure side o f the budget there is little effect. The return o f the increased federal 
income tax as an income supplement will lead to little change in the expenditure share 
on social services because other government services are more income elastic.
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Introduction
A w ell-traveled normative principle o f  fiscal federalism  is that state and local 
governm ents should not pursue income redistribution as a budgetary objective. The 
conventional theory (M usgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972; Ladd and Doolittle, 1982; and 
Brown and Oates, 1987) holds that redistribution should be a central governm ent 
responsibility for two main reasons: first, the benefits o f  redistribution spill-over 
beyond state and local boundaries; second, redistribution policies o f  subnational 
governm ent jurisdictions will be com prom ised by the in-m igration o f  poor fam ilies 
who are attracted by higher benefits and the out-m igration o f  rich families who m ove 
to escape redistributive taxes. Econom ists seem to accept this view, though some 
have challenged it on efficiency grounds.1
However, state and local governm ents do engage in budget policies that have an 
explicit redistributive objective. They have responsibility for the delivery o f  local 
public services that are inherently redistributive (e.g.. health, welfare, and education2) 
and their application o f sales, income and property taxes involves redistribution 
choices (e.g., marginal incom e tax rates, food exem ption under the sales tax, and 
property tax circuit breakers). Voters do appear willing to support state and local 
governm ent redistribution policies (M artinez-Vazquez, 1981).
Federal governm ent policies can exert significant influence on the com position 
o f  state and local budgets, and some o f  the induced changes affect the em phasis on 
distributive services and taxes. The federal influence takes place through price 
effects (tax deductibility provisions on the revenue side and m atching grant 
provisions on the expenditure side) through income effects (block and categorical 
grants, augm ented perhaps by the flypaper phenom enon) through expenditure
‘Pauly (1973) and Johnson (1988) have argued that, if utilities are interdependent, it can be efficient 
for subnational governments to carry out redistributive tax and expenditure policies.
2Federal policy in recent years has been to delegate more responsibility to the states for the m an­
agem ent o f  the most important redistributive programs in health and welfare. This move has been 
interpreted not as a rejection o f  basic principles but a desire to use the states as “ laboratories” to 
increase the efficiency o f the programs (Oates, 1999).
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m andates, and through the interplay with the preferences o f  state and local residents 
for m ore redistributive programs.
Econom ists have devoted less attention than m ight have been expected to 
explaining why som e state and local governm ents choose more progressive fiscal 
instrum ents than do others.3 This paper provides an em pirical m odel to identify the 
determ inants o f  incom e redistribution as a budgetary choice, and estim ates the 
strength o f  these determ inants with state and local governm ent panel data for a 21- 
year period. In particular, we study the follow ing questions:
1. W hat are the characteristics o f  states that undertake higher or lower levels o f 
distribution?
2. Are expenditure-side and tax-side distribution policy instrum ents substitutes 
or com plem ents in state and local governm ent budgets?
3. W hat can past behavior tell us about how state and local governm ents will 
react to an increase in their redistribution responsibilities in the future?4
3M offitt (1990) and Chem ick (1992), are notable exceptions. See also G oodspeed (2000) on the use 
o f  more progressive taxation at the subnational level using cross-country data.
4The 1996 federal shift to block grants is just such a policy. Unfortunately state and local expen­
diture data are not yet available to fully analyze the 1996 shift.
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Empirical Model
This paper is an empirical study o f the redistribution choices o f state and local 
governments.5 In order to answer the three questions posed above, two parameters must 
be estimated for state and local budgets: a revenue distribution index (a) and an 
expenditure distribution index (0). These are defined as:
t B E„ 
a = --------—------  and 0 =
t B  + / B £  + £o o r r R O
where Ep E0 = redistribution and ordinary expenditures, respectively;
tj, t„ = the tax rate on redistributive and non-distributive bases, respectively; 
Br, B0 = redistributive and non-distributive taxes bases, respectively.
A. The Dependent Variables: Measuring Distribution
There is no unambiguous way to measure the emphasis on distribution in state and 
local government budgets, i.e., to quantify a  and 0 as defined above. Virtually every 
government service and every tax has some element of progressivity or regressivity in 
it.6 The choice here is to index the degree o f distributional emphasis based on budget 
shares allocated to redistributive services and revenue shares raised from progressive 
taxes.7
5 A theoretical approach to treating income redistribution as a fiscal choice in a local public goods 
model is presented in Bahl, M artinez-Vazquez, and Wallace (1996).
6For further discussion see Aim and McCallin (1996) and Aim and Zubrow (1987).
7There are at least three ways to index the distribution choice o f  state and local governm ent 
budgets. One is to examine per capita levels o f  redistributive taxes which would tell us whether the 
level o f  redistributive activity is larger or smaller, but would not tell us w hether the local governm ent 
places more or less emphasis on redistribution activities. A second approach is to study redistributive 
taxes and expenditures as a percent o f  personal income. This also is a measure o f  effort but it is not
3
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The proportion o f  state and local governm ents’ individual and corporate income 
taxes in total own source revenue (RVSH) is used here as the indicator o f  the importance 
o f distribution in the state and local government revenue budget (a). There is strong a 
priori reasoning to support this choice. The individual income tax is the one instrument 
that state and local governments may use to single out families for different tax 
treatment based on their income.8 The corporate income tax is also progressive, to the 
extent that its burden falls on owners of capital. There is also a perception among many 
politicians and voters that income taxes on “'business" reduce the tax burden on the 
state 's population because these taxes are paid by richer people who live elsewhere.
Clearly, one index measure cannot capture every facet o f revenue redistribution, 
e.g., one can note quickly that two states may rely to the same degree on income 
taxation but have very different tax thresholds and rate structures. On the other hand, 
we argue that citizens who vote a higher income tax share on themselves perceive that 
they have made a redistributive choice. To provide supporting evidence on the 
“reasonableness” o f the income tax share as a proxy for revenue-side redistribution, we 
examined the correlation o f this measure with four different indexes o f  tax progressivity 
that do take more specific structural features o f taxes into account (Table 1). The 
relationship is positive and significant in every case.
independent o fth e  level o f  the total public sector activity. The third approach is to exam ine the share 
o f  the budget allocated to redistibution. This, we think, com es closest to show ing distributional 
emphasis. It reflects consum er voter choices in the allocation o f  a fixed pie between distribution and 
non-distribution fiscal activities.
“For many years ACIR reported a survey o f  citizen perceptions o f  the “w orst taxes.” The rela­
tively good standing o f  state income taxes in the ACIR annual survey is also an indication o f  
perceived fairness.
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T a b l e  1. S i m p l e  C o r r e l a t i o n s  B e t w e e n  t h e  In c o m e  T a x  S h a r e  A n d  
S e l e c t e d  M e a s u r e s  o f  T a x  P r o g r e s s i v i t y '
Indexes o f  Tax Progressivity Correlation Coefficient*’
Kiefer Index (Kiefer, 1991) 0.44
Suits Index (Kiefer, 1991) 0.40
Chem ick Index (Chemick, 1992)
Gross o f  federal offset 0.72
N et o f federal offset 0.59
Top M arginal Statutory Rate 0.32
"Data are for 49 states (Alaska excluded) for 1990.
bAlI correlation coefficients are positive and significant at the 0.05 level.
NOTES: The Suits index is a measure o f the progressivity o f  tax m easured as the tax liability at 
various levels o f  income. The Kiefer index measures the decrease in inequality o f  the income 
distribution due to the tax system. The Chemick index measures progressivity as the ratio o f  the 
average tax burden o f  the top 5 percent o f  the income distribution divided by the average tax 
burden o f  the lowest quintile.
The proxy measure for expenditure-side distribution (0) is the share o f total state and 
local government expenditures on social services (health, welfare, and primary and 
secondary education), (EXPSH). Again, no single index can capture all o f  the elements 
o f budget redistribution effort. But expenditure incidence analysis is likely to identify 
health, welfare and education expenditures as the most progressive items in government 
budgets.9 In addition, voter perception is likely to be that social service expenditures are 
the budget choice that most improves income redistribution. To demonstrate the 
reasonableness o f this indicator o f expenditure redistribution choice, we estimated 
simple correlations (for 1990) between the health and welfare share o f  total 
expenditures, and the expansiveness o f benefit levels under the key social programs that 
state and local governments control. The simple correlation coefficients have the 
expected positive sign, as shown in Table 2.
9See for exam ple Hayes and Slottje (1989).
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T a b l e  2 .  S i m p l e  C o r r e l a t i o n s  B e t w e e n  t h e  H e a l t h  a n d  W e l f a r e  
E x p e n d i t u r e  S h a r e  A n d  M e a s u r e s  o f  R e d i s t r i b u t i o n 1
Redistribution Measure Correlation Coefficient1’
AFDC/SSIC paym ents per recipient 0.37
A FDC/SSF recipients as a percent o f  population 0.49
M edicaid paym ents per recipient 0.20
M edicaid recipients as a percent o f  population 0.65
'D ata are for 49 states (Alaska excluded) for 1990.
bAll correlation coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level.
cAid for families with dependent children, and supplemental security insurance.
The inclusion o f education expenditures in the expenditure-redistribution index may 
be questioned, but past research has consistently shown a relationship between the level 
o f education expenditures and the reduction in fiscal disparities (Inman, 1979).10 The 
correlation (in 1990) between the education share and the health-welfare share o f  total 
expenditures is 0.44, and it is significant at the 0.10 level.
B. The Determinants of the Distribution Choice
1. Endogenous Variables
Individuals who support expenditure redistributive polices may also care how state 
and local government goods and services are financed; it makes intuitive sense that 
individuals who advocate expanded redistributive services will not want those services 
financed with regressive taxes. The tax and expenditure share variables (RVSH, 
EXPSH) are simultaneously determined in this model and they are expected to behave 
as complements in state and local budgets. We allow for the endogeneity o f two other 
variables: per capita federal aid for health and welfare (RAID) and the poverty rate 
(POV). Federal aid for health and welfare programs will have a significant effect on the
l0Cross-section, tim e-series data on the concentration o f  education expenditure efforts in dis­
tressed areas, on programs for the disadvantaged, etc. are not available.
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likelihood o f  choosing redistributive expenditure policy because o f both income and 
substitution effects. The level o f federal health and welfare aid is itself endogenous to 
this model because the total amount received is determined partly by state and local 
government expenditures on those services.
Higher poverty rates are expected to encourage more redistribution through both tax 
and expenditure policies, but the poverty rate is endogenous to the system because more 
redistributive fiscal policies could encourage in-migration o f the poor or out-migration 
o f the non-poor thereby increasing the poverty rate in a state (MofTitt. 1990; Peterson 
and Rom, 1989; Gramlich and Laren, 1984; Blank, 1985; and Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 
1988; Chemick and Goodspeed, 1997; and Brueckner, 2000)."
2. Expenditure Share Equation
The level o f  real per capita income (REALPI) is used to measure the income effect 
on EXPSH, but it cannot be signed a priori.'2 Population size (POP) will have a 
negative effect on expenditure share, if a “ fixed cost effect” results in social services 
claiming a larger share o f budgets in states with smaller populations. The population 
effect will be positive if larger states can offer a greater scope o f social services. The 
unemployment rate (UNEMP) should be positively related to the expenditure share 
because (a) there is an automatic response o f some entitlement programs expenditures 
to economic downturns, and (b) visible unemployment heightens awareness and 
stimulates voting support for social programs.
"M igration could affect prices and incomes and even federal transfers, and therefore, the final 
dem and for redistribution in the jurisdiction. We estimated the system with variables to control for 
neighboring states policies (such as relative levels o f  revenues and expenditures) and dem ographic 
changes (such as population and income). Due to a lack o f  significance, these neighborhood effects 
were excluded in the final analysis, see Brueckner (2000) for a discussion o f  the literature.
l2The argum ent fo ra  positive income elasticity is based on the existence o f an altruism effect, 
(Hochman and Rodgers, 1969) and on a greater income dem and elasticity for this type o f 
expenditures vis-a-vis non-redistributive public expenditures. If the income elasticity o f  dem and for 
non-redistributive expenditure is greater, celeris paribus, per capita income will exert a negative 
effect on EXPSH. The income effect will be negative if voters act more directly in se lf interest, and 
opt for less redistribution in favor o f  greater budget allocations to services that benefit m iddle- and 
upper-incom e families (e.g., certain types o f infrastructure investment and higher education).
7
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The demand for redistributive services will be stimulated by a lower relative price 
(resulting from a higher federal matching rate). We construct three prices terms, each 
deflated by an index o f private goods prices: health and welfare services, education 
services, and all other state and local government services.
The relative price o f welfare and health services (PHW) is measured here as
PH W  =It
MP1
MPI{ 68)
HE„
THW
WEn
THW
Px
Px
168
where:
the medical price index in year t
the medical price index in 1968
the implicit matching federal rate for health and welfare 
grants, lagged by one period13
total health and welfare expenditures in state /', year /,
{HE,, + WE,,)
Px„ = price o f private goods (measured as the average wage in
the private sector) in state /, year t
Pxi6H = the average wage in the private sector in state /, year
1968 (from BEA)
HE,, = health expenditures in state z, year t
MPI, 
M Pl (68) 
Si. l-l
THW„
l3The variable, g , is com puted as total federal health and welfare grants to  state and local gov­
ernm ents in state / divided by THW,,. We tested alternative specifications o f  this price variable 
including using alterative lags and the general CPI and found no significant differences in our final 
results.
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WE,, = welfare expenditures in state /, year t
The relative price o f education services (EPR) is measured as the ratio o f the average 
wage o f  a teacher to the average wage o f a private sector worker in that state.14 The 
relative price o f all other state and local government services (RPO) is proxied by the 
average salary o f state and local government workers deflated by the average wage o f 
all private sector workers in that state.
The signs o f these price variables in the expenditure share equation are not readily 
predictable. We expect a negative own price elasticity o f demand with respect to PH W 
and EPR, but depending on whether demand is price elastic or price inelastic, total 
expenditure on redistributive services may decrease or increase. When PHW and EPR 
change, the demand for non-redistributive goods may also change. The cross price 
elasticities may be positive or negative depending on whether redistributive and non­
redistributive expenditures are gross substitutes or complements. The total effect o f  the 
price change in PHW and EPR on the expenditure share for redistributive services will 
depend on the relative size o f the own price elasticity and the cross-price elasticity.
The effect o f a higher level of "other" federal grants (OAID)15 on EXPSH will 
depend on the relative income elasticities o f demand for redistributive goods, all other 
state and local government goods, and private goods. If the income elasticity is higher 
for private goods and for non-redistributive goods than for distributive goods, then 
higher levels o f  federal grants will dampen the social service expenditure share. The 
existence o f a flypaper effect for grants, ceteris paribus, will result in a larger 
government budget, but we cannot predict the share effect.
RVSH is included in the EXPSH equation to test whether the two policy instruments 
are substitutes or complements. Federal aid for health and welfare, (RAID) is
NThis measure was correlated with a much more specific average cost index by state, developed 
by Chambers (1998). As teachers’ salaries represent the largest com ponent o f overall education 
expenditure, we were not surprised that our education price variable has a very high, positive, and 
significant correlation with Cham bers’ more inclusive index (currently available only for academic 
years 1987-88, 1989, and 1991).
l5O ther than health and welfare grants.
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endogenous to the model because states may "buy into" programs by spending more, 
and should stimulate the social service expenditure share.16 However, greater state and 
local government expenditures for social services may be induced by lower RAID 
(Quigley and Smolensky, 1990). An interaction dummy variable (RAIDDUM=1 for 
1982 on) is introduced to control for the possibility that the social service expenditure 
response to grants was stronger in this period o f declining aid and increased mandates 
(Quigley and Smolensky, 1990 and Quigley and Rubinfeld, 1996).
The poverty rate (POV) could be positively related to EXPSH because a heavier 
concentration o f  poor voters may demand a more redistributive budget. However, a 
larger concentration o f poor families may solidify opposition against pro-poor services 
by the well-to-do, while the voting turnout o f poor voters may be disproportionately 
low.
3. Revenue Share Equation
The direct income effect (REALPI) on revenue-side distribution would be positive 
if there is an altruism effect. Voters, legislatures and governors have all often stated that 
they see the need to establish some sort o f progressivity in the tax system, and individual 
and business income taxes are commonly thought to achieve this. The higher the 
income, the greater should be the pressure for a shift to income taxation. On the other 
hand, a self-interest effect may dominate for higher income residents and business may 
oppose heavier income taxes. In this case the income effect will be negative. As an 
additional control variable for income effects we include the unemployment rate 
(UNEMP), which should be negatively related to the revenue redistribution share: the 
income tax is more sensitive to the business cycle than are total revenues, and higher 
rates o f  chronic unemployment diminish the potential income tax base and may 
discourage its use relative to other taxes.
To capture the relative price effect in the revenue share equation, we include as an 
independent variable the percent o f families who itemize deductions on their federal
l6We pieced together federal aid for health, education, and welfare program s drawing from the 
Annual Treasury Report o f  federal grants to states. A listing o f  those grants included in this category 
are in Appendix B.
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return (ITEM ).17 A dummy variable (DITEM = 1 from 1987 on) is interacted with the 
percent o f itemizers to account for the impact o f the Tax Reform Act o f 1986. A 
positive coefficient for this interaction variable would indicate that the substitution 
effect resulting from elimination o f sales tax deductibility and the income effect 
resulting from the lower average federal income tax rate after 1986, more than offsets 
the substitution effect o f the lower marginal tax rates for itemizers after 1986. The per 
capita level o f severance taxes is used as a control for the ability to export company 
income taxes, and therefore should be negatively related to the income tax share.
Two endogenous variables are included as determinants o f  the income tax share 
choice. The social service expenditure share (EXPSH) allows a test o f the substitute- 
complement relationship between expenditure-side and revenue-side distribution policy. 
The poverty rate in the state (POV) controls for the possibility that poor people, voting 
in their self interest, may sway the state toward choosing more reliance on income 
taxation. A negative association between the poverty rate and the income tax share 
would indicate an opposition from higher income residents and businesses to taxing a 
narrower base, at presumably a higher rate.
4. Poverty Equation
The determinants o f poverty are complex. As exogenous explanatory variables, we 
use the percent o f black population (BLK) and the percent o f elderly population (OVER 
65) to account for the higher incidence o f poverty among these groups, and the rate o f 
urbanization (URB) since poverty is generally greater in rural areas. The social service 
expenditure share (EXPSH) is also included as an explanatory variable. It may be 
negatively or positively related to the poverty rate depending on whether higher levels 
o f  social service benefits attract and hold the poor and drive away the better off, or 
increase the economic well being o f citizens who otherwise would be poor. We also
l7C hem ick (1991, 1992) also analyzed the redistribution objective on the revenue side o f  the 
budget. He hypothesized that the more progressive (pro-poor) the revenue side o f  the budget, the less 
progressive the expenditure side may need to be. However, he found com plem entarily between the 
two sides o f  the budget in a single equation approach. To measure the tax price for itemizers 
Chem ick used the product o f  the percent o f  itemizers and the first dollar marginal rate o f  itemizers, 
drawing his data from the NBER TAXS1M model. His measure, though theoretically superior, cannot 
be used here because data are not available for the entire sample period. We believe, however, that 
the com bination o f  the ITEM variable and the TRA dum m y will adequately measure this effect.
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include the per capita level o f federal aid for health and welfare programs (RAID) as an 
explanatory variable and expect a positive relationship with the poverty rate.
5. Federal Aid Equation
Real per capita income (REALPI) and the endogenous poverty rate (POV) are 
introduced as explanatory variables in the federal aid equation to account for the extent 
to which the system is intended to be equalizing. In addition, higher rates o f 
unemployment (UNEMP) should stimulate grants if the system o f  assistance responds 
to the business cycle. Population density (DEN), urbanization (URB), and population 
size (POP) are included as control variables to account for interstate variations in 
population and economic structure. The per capita level o f other aid (OAID) is included 
here to control for the substitutability between the two types o f  assistance. Presumably, 
states "specialize" in federal assistance and a higher level o f health and welfare aid may 
affect the level o f  other aid received.
The endogenous expenditure share (EXPSH) is also included as an explanatory 
variable in this equation but the direction o f the effect is not clear. Traditionally, 
analysts have assumed that higher amounts o f  federal aid will result if states buy into 
existing health and welfare programs.
C. Estimation Approach
Estimation is done by two-stage least squares using pooled cross-section, time series 
data for 49 states in the U.S. for the 1969-1990 period.18 A "year" dummy variable 
(1969 = 0) is introduced into each structural equation to address the serial correlation 
problem and to allow for the possibility o f fixed effects at the national level. An 
adjustment is required for those states that do not use either the individual or corporate 
income tax, hence accomplish their fiscal redistribution solely on the expenditure side 
o f the budget. States for which revsh = 0 were excluded from the first stage o f 
estimation so that a non-zero value o f revsh would not be imputed to these states. 
These observations were included in the second stage estimation where
l8We checked theoretical identification o f  the system via rank and order conditions which do hold. 
We also checked “empirical identification” by exam ining the significance o f  included variables in the 
first stage o f  estimation.
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revsh = revsh  = 0 .
The standard errors on all variables are adjusted using a bootstrap technique (Mooney 
and Duval, 1993).
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Results
A . Revenue and Expenditure Equations
The estimation results for the four-equation simultaneous model are presented in 
Table 3 .”  The most important o f the results is the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for the endogenous revenue and expenditure distribution variables. For the 
period observed, states appear to view revenue- and expenditure-side distribution 
policies as complementary and pursue distribution objectives with both. If  a state 
spends I percent more of its budget on redistributive services, it would, on average, raise 
about 0.35 percentage points more o f its revenues from income taxes. If a state raises 
1 percent more o f its revenues from income taxes, it spends 0.041 percent more o f its 
budget on social services.
Expected results are also obtained for the other two endogenous variables. A higher 
poverty rate, ceteris paribus, significantly dampens the share o f social service 
expenditures and the share o f income taxes.20 Budget choices in favor o f  redistribution 
tend to decrease with heavier concentration o f poverty. The endogenous federal aid 
variable (for health and welfare) have a stimulative effect on the redistributive 
expenditure share in the pre-1982 period, and, as shown by the coefficient for 
RAIDDUM, an even stronger effect in the post-1982 (Reagan) era, when grants were 
reduced and mandates were strengthened.21
l9The dum m y variable coefficients are not reported here. However, the sign pattern o f  the dum m y 
variable coefficients suggests that the share o f  expenditures made for redistributive goods during 
1970-1981 were generally greater than those in 1969. From 1982-1990, the expenditure share was 
not significantly different from that in 1969. On the revenue side, the dum m y variable coefficients 
are positive and significant in most years, suggesting that the income tax share was significantly 
greater than that in 1969.
20Interestingly, Goodspeed (2000) finds a positive relationship between income tax shares and 
poverty rates using a single-equation tobit model with international data. In G oodspeed, poverty is 
defined as the percent o f  income held by the lowest 20 percent o f  the population.
2lThis result is consistent with the findings o f M offitt (1984) and Quigley and Sm olensky (1990). 
Also G am khar and Oates (1995) and G am khar (1995) find evidence o f  asym m etries in the response 
o f  state and local governm ent expenditures to increases and decreases in federal grants.
14
State and Local Government
Choices in Fiscal Redistribution
T a b l e  3 .  T w o  S t a g e  L e a s t  S q u a r e s  E s t i m a t e s : E x p e n d i t u r e  S h a r e , 
R e v e n u e  S h a r e , P o v e r t y  a n d  F e d e r a l  A i d  E q u a t i o n s  o n  P o o l e d  C r o s s ­
s e c t i o n , T i m e  S e r i e s  D a t a  f o r  50  S t a t e s  f o r  1969  -  1 9 9 0 I J
Expenditure Share Revenue Share Poverty Federal Aid
BLK 0.2872
(22.18)
POV* -0.2789 -0.3589 1.8957
(4.29) (2.98) (6 0 8 )
RAID* 0.2272 0.0648
(6.75) (5.71)
RVSH* 0.0408
(2.41)
EXPSH* 0.3548 0.0575 -1.0123
(4.22) (1 45) (3.19)
REALPI -0.0036 -0.0034 0.0126
(9.13) (4.51) (7 .02)
PHW 24.8751
(9.76)
EPR -3.0134
(1.28)
RPO -0.0109
(3.11)
RAIDDUM 0.0687
(4.09)
POP 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0012
(2.87) (3.12) (7 .45)
ITEM 0.5786
(11.68)
UN EM P -0.1125 -0.0182 0.5762
(2.11) (0.21) (2 .13)
DEN -0.0079 0.0317
(11.66) (9 .25)
O V ER  65 0.3176
(5.40)
URB -0.0336 -0.5749
(3.01) (9 .65)
DITEM 0.1876
(1 9 4 )
O A ID -0.0553 0.0501
(13.62) (2 .12)
SEVPC -0.0276
(6.50)
RJ 0.4678 0.3389 0.5570 0.2924
'endogenous.
'/-statistics in parenthesis.
2Y ear dum m y variab les not reported.
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1. Price Effects
The response o f the social service expenditure share to an increase in the relative 
price o f  health and welfare services is positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
an inelastic demand for redistributive services. Although the dependent variable 
(EXPSH) is too aggregate to allow the identification o f individual price effects, the 
positive coefficient for the price o f health and welfare and the negative coefficient for 
the price o f other government goods (the cross-price effect), suggest complementarity 
among the two types o f goods. The education price is not a significant determinant o f 
the social service expenditure share.
The price effect in the revenue distribution equation also is significant. The income 
tax share is stimulated by the deductibility o f state and local government income (and 
property taxes) measured here as the percent o f itemizers (ITEM ).22 There was a 
significantly higher stimulative effect as a result o f  TRA86. A higher level o f per capita 
severance tax capacity significantly reduces the income tax share.
2. Incom e Effects
The income effect is negative and significant in both equations. A reduced income 
tax share in response to a higher per capita income suggests that, other things equal, 
higher income voters and the business community are less willing to accept an increased 
reliance on income taxes. Another interpretation is that voters adjust the structure o f 
their tax system to account for the higher built-in elasticity o f the income tax.23 The 
negative income coefficient on the expenditure side implies (assuming that neither o f 
the two goods is inferior) that the income elasticity o f demand o f  non-social services is 
higher than that for social services.
22Courant and Rubinfeld (1987), Feldstein and M etcalf (1987), Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1988), 
Lindsey (1988), and Gade and Adkins (1990), all found evidence o f  a significant effect o f  the tax 
price on state and local government tax structures. Inman (1989) reached a sim ilar conclusion about 
the tax system s o f  city governments.
2,Some will argue that the transactions costs associated with discovering the true impacts o f  
income elastic taxes are high, and consequently voters do not force a reduction in the effective tax 
rate (Buchanan and Dean, 1974). The results here do not support this hypothesis.
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The exogenous federal transfer variable (OAID) is negatively related to the 
expenditure share for social services. The negative coefficient o f OAID, like that o f 
REALPI, can be interpreted as showing that the income demand elasticity for non-social 
services is higher than that for social services. Note that the larger coefficient o f OAID 
(versus REALPI) is consistent with the flypaper effect o f federal grants.
B. The Poverty and Aid Equations
The allocation o f a greater budget share to social services has no significant effect 
on the poverty rate. More per capita federal aid for health and welfare, according to our 
estimates, is associated with a higher rate o f poverty. States with more active federally 
supported social programs either attract or retain more poor families. Another view of 
this result is that the buildup in the concentration o f poverty in poorer states cannot be 
significantly reduced by increased assistance to low income families in a period so short 
as the one generation covered by these data. The effects o f the other control variables 
are as expected. States that are less densely populated, have smaller concentrations o f 
urban population, and have larger proportions o f black and elderly population, tend to 
have significantly more persons with incomes below the federally-defined poverty 
income line.
The results from the federal aid estimation also square with expectations. The share 
o f the budget spent for social services is negatively related to the level o f aid for health 
and welfare. The implication is that states are spending a greater share o f their own 
resources on social expenditures and are relying less on federal assistance. The level o f 
federal aid for health and welfare varies directly with the poverty rate, reflecting the 
focus o f the transfer system on people rather than places. Significantly greater amounts 
o f per capita health and welfare aid go to higher income, more populous and less 
urbanized states. There is also a positive relationship with the level o f  the 
unemployment rate, suggesting that federal assistance does respond to fluctuations in 
economic condition.
C. Elasticities: Direct and Indirect Effects
The combined direct and indirect effects o f the exogenous variables on the 
expenditure and revenue shares tell a more complete story than do the marginal
17
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structural coefficients. In order to capture both the direct and indirect effects o f the 
exogenous variables,24 we calculate the reduced form elasticities o f expenditure and 
revenue shares with respect to each o f the exogenous variables. The elasticity 
coefficients are estimated for 1990 and for the mean value of the sample (Table 4). The 
main results may be summarized by the following stylized facts:
T a b l e  4. C a l c u l a t e d  R e d u c e d  F o r m  R e v e n u e  a n d  E x p e n d i t u r e  S h a r e  
E l a s t i c i t i e s  a t  1990 L e v e l s  a n d  a t  1969-1990 M e a n s
Redistributive Redistributive
Expenditure Share Revenue Share
At 1990 Levels At 1969-90 Means At 1990 Levels At 1969-90 Means
REALPI -0.067 -0.057 -1.158 -1.091
BLK 0.008 0.008 -0.062 -0.066
POP 0.035 0.032 0.039 0.040
URB -0.438 -0.175 -0.181 -0.059
DEN 0.019 0.018 0.044 0.046
OVER 65 -0.176 0.01 -0.053 -0.088
RPO -0.239 -0.229 -0.238 -0.252
ITEM 0.012 0.014 1.005 1.321
DITEM 0.004 0.001 0.326 0.070
OAID -0.062 -0.068 -0.068 -0.082
UNEMP 0.002 0.003 -0.009 -0.012
PHW 0.216 0.203 0.217 0.224
EPR -0.062 -0.057 -0.062 -0.063
SEVPC -0.001 0.000 -0.057 -0.045
NOTE: Significant elasticities are marked in bold print (significant at the 95 percent level or better).
24For an abbreviated structural form o f  the expenditure and revenue share equations, EXPSH = 
P0 + p, RVSH + p , REALPI and RVSH = a„ + ct„ EXPSH + a 2 REALPI, the direct effects o f  
REALPI are P, and a „  and the indirect effect, are: d  EXPSH . <9 RVSH. and d RVSH . d  EXPSH. 
d RVSH a  REALPI d EXPSH d REALPI
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1. The income effect is negative for the redistribution expenditure share and for the 
redistribution revenue share. Higher income states, ceteris paribus, are less 
likely to emphasize income taxation and social service spending. Using sample 
mean values, a 10 percent higher level o f per capita income suggests a 0.6 
percent lower share o f social service spending and a 10 percent lower income 
tax share.
2. An increase in the price of health and welfare services (PHW) drives up the 
social service expenditure share and, indirectly, the income tax revenue share. 
At 1990 levels, a ten percent higher price for health and welfare services will 
increase the social serv ice expenditure share by 2.0 percent and the income tax 
share by about the same amount.
3. A reduction in the percent o f federal income tax itemizers (an increase in the 
price o f income taxes, for some taxpayers) dampens both the income tax share 
and the social service expenditure share, but the expenditure impact is 
significantly smaller.
4. The cross-price elasticity (RPO) is negative on both the social service 
expenditure share and the redistribution revenue share. Higher prices for other 
state and local government goods cause a redistribution o f budget shares away 
from social services and less reliance on progressive sources o f revenues.25
5. Larger concentrations o f black and elderly population in a state lead to more 
redistribution on the expenditure side and less redistribution on the revenue side. 
The elasticities, however, are very low. fh e  redistributive budget shares are, 
ceteris paribus, higher in states with larger populations and in less urbanized 
states.
The estimated overall (direct plus indirect) effects suggest an interesting dynamic. 
When the redistributive expenditure share is stimulated by an exogenous effect (e.g., the 
relative price o f  redistributive goods), the stimulus is transmitted strongly to a larger 
income tax share. Voters in states that choose a higher social service expenditure share
“ "Other" means exclusive o f  health, welfare, and education.
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have a decided preference for heavier income taxes. However, an external stimulus on 
the revenue side is transmitted more weakly to the expenditure side, e.g., a greater 
population o f itemizers may drive up the income tax share in a state but the higher 
income tax share will draw a much smaller social service expenditure response.
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Policy Simulation Results
Further insight from the model can be gained by simulating the potential response 
o f  state budgets to some o f the frequently discussed proposals for changes in federal 
policy. Some o f these simulations are based on proposals that were originally part o f 
the Republican Contract with America, some relate to federal policies on block grants 
that were accepted by Congress, and others are related to individual income tax reforms 
which are on the agenda o f  both political parties. The results are reported in Table 5. 
26 The main question we raise is whether often recommended, efficiency- improving 
measures -- adopting block grants and eliminating state and local income tax 
deductibility -- would have significant effects on state and local governments' choices 
in fiscal redistribution.
T a b l e  5. S i m u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  E f f e c t  o f  C h a n g e s  in  F e d e r a l  P o l i c y  o n  t h e  
R e d i s t r i b u t i v e  R e v e n u e  a n d  E x p e n d i t u r e  S h a r e s  ( I n  P e r c e n t a g e  P o i n t s )
Simulation: 1990 levels
Change in 
Expenditure Share'
Change in 
Revenue Share'
Elim inate the m atch for health and welfare grants, 
and hold all states harmless in terms o f total grants 
received.
5.00 1.76
Replace state and local government income tax 
deductibility with an equal yield credit.
-0.07 -1.31
'Predicted from this simulation, less the share predicted for the baseline 1990 case. 
Unweighted 49-state means.
26The sim ulations were run by first solving the system o f structural equations and then allowing 
for changes to the exogenous variables to compute the corresponding changes in the endogenous 
variables.
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A. Shifting Health and Welfare Financing to Block Grants
In 1996, federal legislation replaced the previous matching grant system to the states 
for health and welfare financing with a system o f block grants which gave the states 
considerable freedom to elect the form and level o f assistance to the poor.27 To carry 
out a simulation o f  the impacts o f this program, we assume elimination o f the matching 
provision in federal grants, but hold each state harmless in terms o f  the total amount o f 
grant revenue received in 1990. In terms o f  our model, all grants would now be received 
as OA1D.
Quite interestingly, the model predicts that the shift to block grants does not lead to 
a de-emphasis o f fiscal redistribution by state and local governments. The significant 
relative price increase for health and welfare services raises the redistributive 
expenditure share fundamentally because o f the relatively low price elasticity o f  demand 
for social welfare services. Thus, states would be buying less services but spending 
more than before. Note that the income effect associated with the shift from matching 
to block grants assumed in the simulation partially offsets the effect o f the change in 
relative prices by lowering the redistributive expenditure share.28 The net effect is 
estimated to be 5-percentage-point increase in the expenditure share for social services 
(Table 5). Quigley and Smolensky ( 1990) found a similar result in an analysis o f  federal 
grant cutbacks in the 1980s: state and local governments responded with higher 
expenditures from their own sources. Gramlich ( 1987) also found that stale and local 
governments picked up expenditures dropped by the federal government in the 1980s. 
The model also predicts a 1.76 percentage-point increase in the income tax share: voters 
would be willing to accept some increase in the income tax share so that their 
redistribution target would not be met entirely on the expenditure side o f the budget.
27See M cGuire (1997).
28Recall that both the per capita income and "other aid" response coefficients are negative in the 
structural expenditure share equation.
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B. Eliminating Deductibility for State and Local Government Income 
Taxes
A second simulation removes the deductibility o f state and local government income 
taxes paid from federal income tax liability. The total amount o f additional income tax 
that would be paid to the federal government under this scenario is $20 billion in 1990.29
In this experiment, $20 billion is allocated back to personal income in the states in 
proportion to each state's aggregate federal tax liability. It is as though the deductibility 
o f state income taxes was replaced by an equal amount of general credit against federal 
tax liability.
This policy change would have two impacts. First, it would reduce the number of 
income tax payers who itemize deductions, thereby raising the price o f state income 
taxes and lowering the income tax share. Second, it would increase the level o f (after 
tax) personal income thereby further reducing the income tax share. The total effect is 
that the redistribution revenue share would fall by about 1.31 percentage points. On the 
expenditure side o f the budget there is little effect. The return o f the increased federal 
income tax as an income supplement will lead to little change in the expenditure share 
on social services because other government services are more income elastic.
The two above policies enacted simultaneously would have partially offsetting 
effects but would still lead to an overall increase in the expenditure and revenue shares. 
Either o f these two reforms would represent a significant step toward the "Fend for 
Yourself' federalism that many have advocated in recent years. The efficiency gains 
from such a program have been generally accepted by economists, but many policy 
analysts have questioned whether there would be undesirable equity impacts. Our 
simulations indicate that the emphasis on redistribution in state and local government 
budgets would not decline, as measured by expenditure share on social services.
29The $20 billion was estimated using IRS, Statistics o f  Income data for 1990, assum ing an aver­
age marginal tax rate for itemizers o f  approximately 23 percent.
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Conclusions
We set out to answer three empirical questions in this paper:
•  What are the characteristics o f states that undertake higher or lower levels o f 
distribution?
•  Do states view revenue-side and expenditure-side distribution instruments as 
substitutes or complements?
•  What can past behavior tell us about how state and local governments will react 
to policies that give them more responsibility in redistributional policies?
The answer to the first question is that, at the margin, and taking both direct and 
indirect effects into account, we might expect more emphasis on social services in the 
expenditure budgets o f states that are less urbanized and have lower levels o f  income. 
On the revenue side, states with lower levels o f income, less urbanized populations, and 
a smaller concentration o f black and elderly population tend to make more use o f 
income taxes. Prices do seem to matter. Higher federal matching grant rates lead to 
more redistribution, as does a larger percent o f federal income tax itemizers.
The answer to the second question is that revenue and expenditure distribution 
instruments are complements. States that use income taxes more heavily are likely to 
weigh social services more heavily in their expenditure budgets, and vice versa.
The policy question toward which this work is pointed is whether efficiency- 
improving reforms in the federal system are likely to have undesirable equity 
consequences by inducing state and local governments to spend less for social services 
and to tax less from progressive bases. Our empirical answer is that the shift to block 
grants will induce more emphasis on distribution because the demand for redistributive 
expenditures is price inelastic. State and local governments react to the increase in price 
by reducing the quantity o f social services provided, ceteris paribus, but they will 
dedicate a larger share o f their budgets to redistributive services. The implications o f
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our findings for federal policy is that matching grants are not more effective than block 
grants in leading state and local governments to spend a larger share o f their budgets on 
health, education and welfare. The elimination o f income tax deductibility, on the other 
hand, would lead to less reliance on income taxation in state and local government.
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Appendix
T a b l e  A .  L i s t  o f  V a r i a b l e s
Mean
Values
Standard
Deviation
EXPSH = expenditures on health, education, and welfare as a percent o f 
total expenditures;
44 63 4 21
RVSH = individual and corporate income taxes as a percent o f  total 
taxes;
14 58 8 2 0
BLK = percent o f  black population; 9.25 9 20
OVER 65 = percent o f  population older than 65 years o f  age; 11 11 2.00
URB - percent o f  population living in urban areas; 67.03 1443
REALPI = per capita personal income; 3971.76 756.80
POV = percent o f  population with income below the poverty line; 13.12 4 45
RAID = per capita federal aid for health and welfare services; 58 64 18 16
OAID - per capita federal aid for all functions other than health and 
welfare;
84.79 35.89
UNEMP » unemployment rate; 6.32 2.60
ITEM - percent o f federal income taxpayers who itemize; 32.77 8 12
DEN = population per square mile; 157.26 222.87
PHW - the relative price o f  health and welfare services; 0 4 4 0.13
EPR = the relative price o f  education services; 1.03 0.12
POP - state population (000's); 4565.97 4751.23
RAIDDUM = a dummy variable, that takes a value o f  1 if  year = 1982 or 
later, interacted with RAID;
26.07 32.50
DITEM = a dummy variable that takes the value o f  1 if year = 1987 or 
later, interacted with ITEM;
5.34 11.62
RPO = the average wage of all state and local government workers 
divided by the average w age o f all workers in the state.
1.136 0.11
SEVPC = relative per capita severance tax revenues 23.17 75.53
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A ppendix
Data Sources
Variable Source
State-Local Income Tax Revenue U.S. Department o f  Com merce, Bureau
State-Local Total Taxes o f  the Census,
State-Local Social Service Expenditure Census o f  Governments, 1962, 1967,
Federal Aid to State and Local Governments 
Population
Per Capita Personal Income
1972, 1977, 1982, 1987
Percent o f  Population Below Poverty U.S. Department o f  Com m erce, Bureau 
o f  the Census,
Current Population Survey, P-60 Series
Percent o f  Population Black U.S. Department o f  Com merce, Bureau
Percent o f  Population Over 65 o f  the Census, Statistical Abstract,
Percent o f  Population in Urban Areas 
Population Density
Selected Years
Percent o f  Population Itemizing Federal Income Tax Internal Revenue Service, Statistics o f
Returns Income, Selected Years
Federal Aid to State and Local Governm ents for The programs included in the RAID
Health and Welfare variable are: Child nutrition; Food 
stamps; Health services planning and 
developm ent; M ental health research 
services; Preventative health services; 
Health m anpow er education and 
utilization; Child w elfare services; 
M aintenance assistance ; M edical 
assistance; Social services; State and 
local training; Social and rehabilitation 
services; Work incentives activities
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